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Successfully integrating newcomers into native communities has become a key issue for policy mak-
ers, as the growing number of migrants has brought cultural diversity, new skills, and at times,
societal tensions to receiving countries. We develop an agent-based network model to study in-
teracting “hosts” and “guests” and identify the conditions under which cooperative/integrated or
uncooperative/segregated societies arise. Players are assumed to seek socioeconomic prosperity
through game theoretic rules that shift network links, and cultural acceptance through opinion dy-
namics. We find that the main predictor of integration under given initial conditions is the timescale
associated with cultural adjustment relative to social link remodeling, for both guests and hosts.
Fast cultural adjustment results in cooperation and the establishment of host-guest connections
that are sustained over long times. Conversely, fast social link remodeling leads to the irreversible
formation of isolated enclaves, as migrants and natives optimize their socioeconomic gains through
in-group connections. We discuss how migrant population sizes and increasing socioeconomic re-
wards for host-guest interactions, through governmental incentives or by admitting migrants with
highly desirable skills, may affect the overall immigrant experience.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
Migrating human populations have always played a significant role in history [1–3]. For centuries individuals driven
by adventurous spirits, or seeking better socio-economic opportunities, have voluntarily abandoned their original
environments. Large groups of people have also been involuntarily forced from their homelands by hostile events
such as famine, drought, religious persecution, political turmoil, human rights violations, and wars. According to the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the number of forcibly displaced persons worldwide has
been steadily climbing since 2011, reaching an unprecedented level of 68.5 million persons by the end of 2017. Among
these 28.5 million are asylum seekers or refugees [4]. Economic disparity enhances the pull of populations towards
more developed regions; increased mobility reduces the cost in crossing national borders and geographic barriers;
advanced communication technologies facilitate long distance social connections. All of these factors contribute to
the massive scale of human migration observed in recent years [5].
While large-scale emigration causes brain drain and loss of labor force in “source” countries, regions receiving
immigrants also face challenges in accommodating new arrivals who may follow different social, cultural, and religious
norms. Mistrust between natives and migrants may arise and exacerbate over time due to inadequate infrastructure
and assistance programs. A well-documented phenomenon among immigrants is that of acculturative stress [6, 7],
whereby contact with another culture may lead to psychological and somatic health issues. Overall various studies of
the immigrant experience describe outcomes ranging from very positive to very negative [6, 8–10]. Immigrants joining
a multicultural society generally suffer from the least acculturative stress and are the best adapted, whereas those
settling in less culturally tolerant communities face more challenges [8, 9]. A common observation is that those who
do not adapt well, either by circumstances or lack of motivation, often become socially marginalized. Self-segregation
may lead to the creation of insular communities that offer advantages to immigrants, but that also prevent them from
fully integrating [6, 8, 10]. These enclaves often deepen divisions between host and immigrant groups. The attitude
of the majority host population is an important predictor of how successful the adaptation process of an immigrant
group will be. Hostile host communities tend to hinder adaptation, with averse majorities playing a key role in the
emergence of segregated minority communities [11, 12].
The complex relationship between natives and migrants evolves over time and depends on many economic, historic,
and political factors. By framing the main ingredients of this relationship in simple, quantifiable ways, mathematical
models may help one to understand the implications of various mechanisms and of their synergy, and may help
design intervention strategies. Agent-based mathematical models have been recently employed to study coexistence
and cooperation among culturally heterogeneous populations through game theory [13–22], opinion dynamics [23–
31], population dynamics [32–34], and network theory [14, 15, 17, 35]. In this paper we introduce an agent-based
social-network model that assumes immigrant groups have two primary objectives: to improve their socioeconomic
status and to gain acceptance within their social circles. The former scenario is usually modeled by implementing game
theory rules, whereby a utility function associated with socioeconomic status is to be maximized [13, 14, 16, 17, 19, 21].
The latter is typically described using opinion dynamics, whereby individuals adjust their opinions or cultural traits
through social interactions [23–28, 30, 31, 36]. Simplistic game theory models rarely yield cooperative patterns, as
defectors tend to prevail if each agent is allowed to only make rational decisions for his or her own self-interest [19].
Cooperative behavior may emerge through biased decision making whereby individuals collaborate solely with those
that share their same opinion. This mechanism leads to social segregation, as tight collaborations develop only within
culturally homogeneous enclaves [13–17, 20, 21, 37]. Models of opinion dynamics on the other hand often assume
individuals seek like-minded peers, and willingly adjust to prevailing opinions [32, 36]. Minority opinions arise and
persist only through ad-hoc restrictions, such as including zealots, or by imposing thresholds so that consensus is
reached only if two opinions are sufficiently close [37, 38].
As a rule of thumb, game theoretic models result in uncooperative behavior; opinion dynamics leads to uniform
consensus. The immigrant narrative, however, is much more nuanced with behaviors ranging from uncooperative
segregation to cooperative integration, suggesting modeling should include both mechanisms. We thus introduce a
network populated with interacting “guest” and “host” nodes that seek to improve their socioeconomic status while
culturally adjusting to each other. Socioeconomic gains are modeled via a utility function that evolves through
game theoretic rules, while the attitudes (or “opinions”) that players harbor towards others evolve through opinion
dynamics. These two mechanisms are interdependent, so that attitudes towards different cultures shape utility gains,
and vice versa.
We show that the main predictor of integration or segregation is given by the relationship between two timescales:
that of cultural adjustment, whereby guests and hosts adapt more tolerant attitudes of each other, and that of social
link remodeling, whereby players change their network connections to increase their socioeconomic rewards. In the case
of slow cultural adjustment, immigrant and host communities tend to segregate as accumulation of socioeconomic
wealth occurs more efficiently through insular in-group connections. Conversely, if adjustment is sufficiently fast,
cross-cultural bridges may be established and sustained, allowing different cultural groups to reach “consensus” and
3maintain active cooperation. Another key role will be played by the fraction of immigrants joining the total population
as the immigrant-to-host ratio changes the cultural adjustment timescales. As we outline below, a high immigrant ratio
increases the likelihood of in-group connections and reduces communication between immigrant and host populations.
In Section II, we introduce our network model, the mechanisms that govern the evolution of social connections,
and the utility function for immigrant-host interactions. In Section III we examine the parameter dependence of
our model and show how processes unfolding over different timescales lead to different outcomes of immigration
integration. Finally, we conclude in Section IV with a discussion on sociological and policy implications.
II. THE MODEL
Our basic model consists of a network whose nodes symbolize immigrant or native agents connected by edges that
represent social links. Each node is also associated with an attitude and a utility function that depend on its
connections and that determine an agent’s socioeconomic status. Over time, nodes change their connections and
attitudes as they seek to increase their utility; as a result the network evolves towards integration or segregation
between immigrant and host communities.
A. Network
Within our network model a node represents a social unit, such as an individual or a collection of individuals, and
is labeled as a “guest” or a “host”, depending on whether it belongs to the immigrant or native group. Each node,
indexed by i, is characterized by an “attitude” variable xti at time t, which varies between −1 ≤ xti ≤ 0 for guest
nodes and in 0 ≤ xti ≤ 1 for host nodes. Hence the sign of xti is used to distinguish the group identity of the node.
The magnitude |xti| indicates the degree of hostility that node i harbors towards those belonging to the other group.
Thus, xti → 0± characterizes most receptive guests or most hospitable hosts, while xti = ±1 represents the highest
level of xenophobia. Moreover, we define Ωti as the “social circle” of node i at time t, which is a set containing all
nodes directly connected to node i at time t. We assume that there are a fixed number of Nh host and Ng guest
nodes, with varying attitudes. All nodes N = Nh +Ng seek to maximize their utility function as defined below.
B. Utility Function
The dynamics of our network is driven by the utility function U ti assigned to each node i. Each player seeks to
maximize U ti by shifting its attitude x
t
i, and by forging and severing connections with other nodes. We model the
utility U ti of node i at time t via two components: a reward function u
t
ij for interacting with node j, and a cost
function c(mti) for maintaining m
t
i connections so that
U ti =
∑
j∈Ωi
utij − c(mti) (1)
=
∑
j∈Ωti
Aij exp
(
−
(
xti − xtj
)2
2σ
)
− exp
(
mti
α
)
.
The pairwise reward function utij depends on the attitude difference |xti − xtj | between connected nodes i and j; the
smaller the attitude difference, the higher the reward. For a pair of nodes from the same group, i.e. if both i and
j are hosts or immigrants, maximizing utij implies x
t
i = x
t
j leading to consensus within the group. If i and j are
nodes from different groups, utij is maximized by both sides adopting more cooperative attitudes such that x
t
i → 0−
and xtj → 0+. Hence, the value of xti that will maximize U ti will depend on the composition of Ωti and the attitudes
xtj of its members. The parameter σ controls the sensitivity of the reward, while the amplitude Aij specifies the
maximum reward attainable when xti = x
t
j . In principle, Aij may depend on the specific socioeconomic attributes of
the interacting i, j pair. For simplicity we let Aij be one of two discrete levels; Aij = Ain for in-group interactions,
where nodes i and j belong to the same group, both hosts or both migrants, and Aij = Aout for out-group interactions
between nodes i and j of different groups. The cost function c in Eq. 1 is a function of mti = |Ωti|, the number of
connections sustained by node i at time t, which by definition is also the cardinality of the social-circle set Ωti. We
assume that the cost to maintain connections increases exponentially with mti through a scaling coefficient α. A smaller
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FIG. 1. Model diagram. Each node i is characterized by a variable attitude −1 ≤ xti ≤ 1 at time t. Negative values, depicted in
red, indicate guest nodes; positive values represent hosts, colored in blue. The magnitude |xti| represents the degree of hostility
of node i towards members of the other group. Each node is shaded accordingly. All nodes j, k linked to the central node i
represent the green-shaded social circle Ωti of node i at time t. The utility U
t
i of node i depends on its attitude relative to that
of its mti connections in Ω
t
i and on m
t
i. Nodes maximize their utility by adjusting their attitudes x
t
i and by establishing or
severing connections, reshaping the network over time.
α value results in a steeper increase of cost, leading to fewer average connections per node. Note that such a cost
function penalizes nodes with too many connections, suppressing the likelihood of “hub” nodes of high connectivity,
a hallmark of small world networks that characterizes many real world social networks. In more realistic settings, the
cost of maintaining social connections depends on more nuanced characteristics of each individual (wealth, fame, age,
community status), allowing some to sustain higher degrees of connectivity than others. For simplicity our model
does not include these considerations.
C. Mechanisms of Model Evolution
At each time step, each node i seeks to increase its utility U ti by adding or cutting connections and adjusting its
attitude xti. We model this process as a series of stochastic events through the following steps:
1. At time t, randomly pick the “active” node i to make a decision.
2. Randomly pick another node j 6= i.
• If i and j are connected, i.e., j ∈ Ωti, check whether breaking the i–j connection increases U ti for node i. If
it does, break the i–j connection.
• If j /∈ Ωti, check whether adding an i–j connection increases U ti for node i. If it does, add the i–j connection.
3. Randomly pick a connected node ` ∈ Ωti via a reward-weighted probability
p` =
uti`∑
`∈Ωti u
t
i`
. (2)
5Symbol Description default values
xi attitude -1 to 1
Ain maximal utility through in-group connection 10
Aout maximal utility through out-group connection 1 to 100
σ sensitivity to attitude difference 1
κ attitude adjustment timescale 100 to 1000
α cost of adding connections 3
N total population 2000
Ng guest population 20 to 200
Nh host population N −Ng
TABLE I. List of variables and parameters of the model.
4. Determine xt+1i using x
t
i, x
t
`
xt+1i =

min
(
0, xti +
xt` − xti
κ
)
for xti < 0 (guest),
max
(
0, xti +
xt` − xti
κ
)
for xti > 0 (host),
(3)
where κ is the timescale associated with attitude adjustment. Large values of κ indicate longer adaptation
times. We select different nodes j 6= ` for remodeling network connections and adjusting attitudes to avoid the
emergence of any systematic biases.
5. Advance time t→ t+ (1/N) and repeat steps 1–4.
In the above steps, all unweighted random selections are made through a uniform probability. As presented, our
algorithm alternates between remodeling network connections and making attitude adjustments. Note that when
steps 1–4 are repeated on all N nodes, t advances to t+1, and that, on average, each node makes decisions once within
this unitary time step. Thus, the timescale for network remodeling is one. The timescale for attitude adjustment,
instead, is given by κ scaled by the probability for node i to be paired with node ` carrying a different attitude. We
can approximate this probability as the fraction of out-group connections, Ng/N for hosts and Nh/N for guests, so
that the guest adjustment timescale τh can be estimated by τh ∼ κN/Ng, and the host adjustment timescale τg by
τg ∼ κN/Nh.
An important observation is that U ti can reach its maximum U
max
i if |xti−xtj | → 0 within connected components of
the network. This can be achieved in two different ways: i) through actual consensus where all nodes carry a neutral
attitude xti → 0 so that in-group and out-group connectivities are equally likely, or ii) through a segregated network
with homogeneous clusters made of all guests or all hosts, where non-zero but uniform attitudes are maintained in each
cluster, so that |xi − xtj | → 0 does not necessarily imply xti → 0. Although these two different network configurations
lead to the same maximal utility, only the first one will be considered a true hallmark of harmonious integration,
since attitudes are the most open on both sides, and there is minimal differentiation between intra-group or out-group
connectivity. The second case instead represents the creation of parallel societies, with each group self-segregating
into its own homogeneous enclave, maintaining little contact with “the other”.
D. Initial Conditions
All model parameters and typical values are listed in Table I. Unless otherwise specified, our network simulations are
performed using the initial conditions described here. We mostly simulate N = 2000 nodes, within which Nh = 1800
are hosts and Ng = 200 are guests. In Section III A we also simulate the setting of Ng = 20 and Nh = 1980 to examine
the effect of extremely small fractions of guests. The initial attitudes are set at x0i = 1 for all host nodes, and x
0
i = −1
for all guest nodes, assuming that before the two groups make any contact they have minimal knowledge on how to
coexist. For initial connections, we mostly use the following two extreme and opposite scenarios. One is that host and
guest nodes are randomly connected with uniform probability, yielding on average ten connections per node at t = 0.
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FIG. 2. Simulated network dynamics leading to (a) complete segregation, and (b) integration between guest (red) and host
(blue) populations. Shading of node colors represents the degree of hostility |xti| of node i towards those of its opposite group,
according to the color scheme shown in Fig. 1. Initial conditions are randomly connected guest and host nodes with attitudes
x0i,guest = −1 and x0i,host = 1. Other parameters are Nh = 900, Ng = 100, α = 3, Ain = Aout = 10, σ = 1. The two panels differ
only for κ, the attitude adjustment timescale, with κ = 1000 in panel (a) and κ = 100 in panel (b). (a) For slowly changing
attitudes (κ = 1000), hostile attitudes persist over time, eventually leading to segregated clusters. (b) For fast changing
attitudes (κ = 100), guests initially become more cooperative, as shown by the lighter red colors. Over time, a more connected
host–guest cluster arises with hosts eventually adopting more cooperative attitudes as well.
The other is that hosts are connected to each other and that no guests are present. Host connectivity is determined
by allowing the system to equilibrate in the absence of guests, representing the natural state of the community before
the arrival of immigrants. Guests are introduced at t = 0 as nodes without any links to either hosts or fellow guests.
Note that because of the definition of the utility function in Eq. 1, and because we allow the host community to
equilibrate prior to inserting guests, we expect each host to be connected to an average number of α ln (αAin) other
hosts at t = 0. The first initial condition scenario represents a perfectly executed welcoming program for immigrants,
providing with them sufficient social ties to connect to the native community. In the second initial condition scenario,
such a welcoming program does not exist at all, and guests arrive in a completely foreign environment.
III. RESULTS
Figure 2 shows two representative outcomes of our network model at steady state. In Fig. 2a guests (red circles) and
hosts (blue circles) segregate and maintain highly hostile attitudes, as illustrated by the dark red and blue shades of
the right hand panel. Cross-group utilities at the beginning of simulations yield low rewards which do not increase
over time, leading to the severing of all ties between hosts and guests at t → ∞. In Fig. 2b guests adopt more
cooperative attitudes as represented by the lighter red colors. Such attitudes increase cross-group rewards so that
guests and hosts stay mixed. Hosts will also become more cooperative, although at slower timescales than guests.
The two configurations shown in Fig. 2 represent two ways through which U ti in Eq. 1 is maximized. The configu-
ration in Fig. 2a arises by cutting all cross-group links to form enclaves, within which guests and hosts adopt uniform
but different attitudes xi,guest 6= xi,host 6= 0. The configuration in Fig. 2b emerges through cooperative attitudes
xi,guest = xi,host = 0 for all players. Both lead to |xti − xtj | → 0 as t→∞. To which of these two basins of attraction
society converges, will depend on parameter choices and initial conditions as discussed below.
A. Maximizing utilities via network remodeling and attitude adjustment
For a more quantitative perspective, we now examine how the utility function U ti and the attitude profiles x
t
i vary
over time in some sample simulations. We set the model parameters to α = 3, Ain = Aout = A = 10, and σ = 1, and
let κ vary between 100 and 1000 with N = 2000 and Ng = 200 or Ng = 20. The assumption Ain = Aout = A leads to
a maximum in the utility U ti = U
max
i = αA[ln(αA)− 1] which is reached if all connected nodes conform their attitude
7so that |xti − xtj | → 0 for any linked i, j pair and when each node i has mti = mopt = α ln(Ainα) links. For our chosen
parameters, mopt = 10 connections and U
max
i = 72.
Since we are interested in how immigrants adapt to their host environment, we will mainly focus on quantities
associated with guest nodes. Although host node properties will also dynamically evolve, relative changes to their
attitudes xti and connections will be much slower than that of guests due to their overwhelming majority. Initial
conditions are chosen so that guests and hosts are randomly connected to each other as described in Section II D. For
Ng = 200 the relatively large number of guests allows for segregated clusters to emerge and persist with mopt = 10
in-group connections. For Ng = 20 the low number of guests either leads to smaller in-group guest clusters with
less-than-optimal number of connections (mopt < 10), or forces host-guest mixture to reach mopt = 10. We will first
examine network remodeling and attitude adjustment independently of each other, and later the interplay between
the two mechanisms.
Figure 3 shows the temporal evolution of the average utility 〈U ti 〉guest per guest node and the average attitude of
guests and hosts 〈xti〉guest 〈xti〉host for sample simulations of Ng = 200 (Figs. 3a and 3b) and Ng = 20 (Figs. 3c and 3d)
guest nodes with N = 2000 total nodes. In the red-solid curves we only allow for network remodeling, and deactivate
attitude adjustment. Vice-versa, in the blue-dashed (κ = 100) and green-dotted curves (κ = 1000) we only allow for
attitude adjustment and deactivate network remodeling. Finally, the purple dotted-dashed curve (κ = 100) and the
magenta-double-dotted-dashed curve (κ = 1000) are results from the full model, where both network remodeling and
attitude adjustment are implemented.
As can be seen in Fig. 3a for Ng = 200, 〈U ti 〉guest increases over time towards Umaxi = 72 for all five chosen cases.
When only network remodeling is allowed (red-solid curve), 〈U ti 〉guest increases quickly at the onset of the dynamics
as nodes efficiently exchange low-utility, out-group connections for high-utility, in-group ones. As the number of
exchanges nears completion, 〈U ti 〉guest increases at a slower rate, until it converges to the steady state at Umaxi = 72
with optimal, high-utility connections that are mostly in-group. Guests have established their own self segregated
communities and thrive within it. When only attitude adjustment is activated (blue-dashed κ = 100 and green-dotted
κ = 1000 curves), nodes can only change their attitude and not their connections, hence they tend to evolve towards
conformity (|xti − xtj | → 0 for all nodes i, j). Note that if i, j are a guest-host pair respectively, conformity will only
arise from xi,host → 0−, xj,host → 0+. Since 〈U ti 〉guest depends solely on attitude adjustment, its dynamics will vary
on the same timescale as xti, given by τg = N/Nhκ. In the case of fast attitude adjustment (blue-dashed curve for
κ = 100), the early rise of 〈U ti 〉guest can be more pronounced than in the case of network remodeling (red-solid curve),
as can be seen for short times (t . 2000) in Fig. 3a. However, the utility at steady state 〈U ssi 〉guest under attitude
adjustment is lower than under network remodeling, regardless of κ. This is because when only attitude adjustment
is allowed, network connections cannot be rearranged, resulting in a less-than-optimal connectivity that changes to
xti can only partially alleviate. Having network adjustment as the sole mechanism at play allows for more flexibility,
since, although xti cannot change, a given node can actively search for others with similar attitude and even increase
its number of connections. We verified that when only one of the two mechanisms is allowed, attitude adjustment
consistently leads to less optimal outcomes compared to network remodeling for a number of parameter choices and
initial conditions.
These trends are confirmed and better elucidated by inspecting the average attitudes of guests −1 ≤ 〈xti〉guest ≤ 0
and hosts 0 ≤ 〈xti〉host ≤ 1 as a function of time in Fig. 3b. We use the same parameter sets and initial conditions
as in Fig. 3a and the same color-coding scheme. The red-solid curves correspond to the case where we only allow for
network readjustment and attitudes stay unmodified, so 〈xti〉guest = −1 and 〈xti〉host = 1 for all times. The blue-dashed
and green-dotted curves, where only attitude adjustment is allowed show that as t increases, 〈xti〉guest → 0− at a faster
rate, and that 〈xti〉host → 0+ at a much slower one. This is easily understood. Since nodes are not allowed to rewire
their connections, they can only adapt their attitudes as discussed above, and provided the network is connected and
no isolated clusters exist, all nodes will eventually conform to xti → 0. However, being a numerical minority in the
network, guests, for which xti,guest ≤ 0, will share a large number of connections with hosts, for which xt`,host ≥ 0.
Under this condition, the adaptation rules presented in Sec. II C drive guests towards conformity more than hosts, so
that 〈xti〉guest → 0− faster than 〈xti〉host → 0+. Hence, the early increases in 〈U ti 〉guest when only attitude adjustment
is allowed and observed in Fig. 3a (blue-dashed κ = 100, and green-dotted κ = 1000 curves) can be attributed to fast
adaptation of guests with time scale τg = κN/Nh, and the later increases to slow adaptation of hosts with time scale
τh = κN/Ng  τg.
The dynamics of the full model (purple-dotted-dashed κ = 100, and magenta-double-dotted-dashed κ = 1000 curves)
depend on the interplay between the two mechanisms at play, attitude adjustment and network remodeling, and the
respective timescales in gaining utility. From Fig. 3a, 〈U ti 〉guest for the full model with fast attitude adjustment (purple-
dotted-dashed, κ = 100) follows the attitude adjustment (blue-dashed, κ = 100) curve at early times, later shifting
towards the network remodeling (red-solid) curve. Guests thus find it more advantageous to first adjust their attitudes,
and then modify their network connectivity. Similarly, Fig. 3b shows 〈xti〉guest → 0− as t → ∞, following the curve
where only attitude adjustment is allowed. The convergence of 〈xti〉host → 0+ is slower because network remodeling
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FIG. 3. Dynamics of the average utility per node 〈U ti 〉guest in panels (a) and (c), and of the average attitudes 〈xti〉guest, 〈xti〉host
in panels (b) and (d) for Ng = 200 (a,b) and Ng = 20 (c,d) guests in a total population of N = 2000 nodes. Parameters
are α = 3, Ain = Aout = 10, and σ = 1, and κ = 100 (faster) and κ = 1000 (slower) attitude adjustment. Initial attitudes
are x0i,host = 1 and x
0
i,guest = −1, with random connections between nodes so that on average each node is connected to
m0i = 10 others at t = 0, representing full insertion of guests into the community. Network remodeling (solid-red curve) and
attitude adjustment (blue-dashed and green-dotted curves) are considered separately; their interplay is illustrated in full model
simulations (purple-dot-dashed and magenta-double-dotted-dashed). Utility is increased in all cases, but attitude adjustment
is more efficient at the onset due to the initially set cross-group connections. Network remodeling allows for higher utilities at
longer times. For the full model, fast adjustment (κ = 100) leads to well integrated societies for Ng = 200 as t → ∞, given
that 〈xti〉host → 0+ and 〈xti〉guest → 0−; for Ng = 20 hosts and guests segregate, with guests adopting collaborative attitudes,
〈xti〉host → 0.93 and 〈xti〉guest → 0−. Under slow adjustment (κ = 1000) hosts and guests will remain hostile and segregated
with 〈xti〉host → 0.95, 〈xti〉guest → −0.34 for Ng = 200 and 〈xti〉host → 0.99, 〈xti〉guest → 0− for Ng = 20.
allows the many hosts to replace their relatively few out-group connections with conspecifics. Eventually however,
both guests and hosts converge towards integration, with 〈xti〉guest → 0−, 〈xti〉host → 0+. In contrast, 〈U ti 〉guest for the
full model with slow attitude adjustment (magenta-double-dotted-dashed κ = 1000) follows the network remodeling
(red-solid) curve at all times. Here, guests find it more advantageous to change their connectivity, preferentially
creating links to other guest nodes, rather than modify their attitudes towards host communities. Indeed attitudes
converge to 〈xti〉guest → −0.34 and 〈xti〉host → 0.95 as t→∞, with no further attitude adjustment possible.
This example illustrates the central role played by κ in the dynamics: low values of κ, indicating relatively short
times for attitude adjustment τg, τh, lead to harmonious societies with xi → 0 for all nodes, while larger values of κ,
indicating longer times for attitude adjustment, lead to segregated communities.
In Figs. 3c and 3d we show 〈U ti 〉guest and 〈xti〉guest for a smaller immigrant population, Ng = 20 and the same
parameters as in Figs. 3a and 3b. We observe the same qualitative increase of utility in each of the five cases as
discussed above. Discrepancies with plots obtained for Ng = 200 mainly emerge when only attitude adjustment is
allowed (blue-dashed κ = 100, and green-dotted κ = 1000 curves). Here, the early increase of utility is faster than
for Ng = 200, but steady state is reached at a much slower rate. The overwhelming majority of hosts drives guests
to rapidly adjust their attitudes, increasing 〈U ti 〉guest at short times. By the same token, the host majority will not
significantly change its attitude, so that guests can further increase their utility only by remodeling their connectivity.
Indeed, the corresponding curves in Fig. 3d show guests rapidly converging to 〈xti〉guest → 0− for all cases, while
〈xti〉host does not. Note that as long as the network is initially connected and no isolated clusters exist, when only
attitude adjustment is allowed, 〈xti〉host → 0+ as t→∞, although the process may be slow. For Ng = 20, due to the
low number of guests, there is a higher probability than for Ng = 200 of initiating the model with isolated host-only
clusters. For these clusters, if only attitude adjustment is allowed, attitudes will stay quenched at 〈xti〉host → 1. As a
result, the overall 〈xti〉host will converge towards a non zero value.
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FIG. 4. Dynamics of the integration index Itint in panels (a) and (c) and of the out-group reward fraction v
t
out in panels (b)
and (d). Parameters and initial conditions are the same as in Fig. 3. (a, b) Large migrant population Ng = 200. Here, I
t
int → 0
and vtout → 0 at long times when only network remodeling is allowed, and nodes seek links with conspecifics. If only attitude
adjustment is allowed, Itint remains fixed due to the quenched network connectivity, while v
t
out increases as guests and hosts
adopt more cooperative attitudes. For the full model, slow attitude changes (κ = 1000) lead to segregation and Itint → 0,
vtint → 0 as t → ∞. Fast attitude changes (κ = 100) lead to non-zero values of Itint and vtout, indicating a more cooperative
society. (c, d) Small migrant population Ng = 20. Results are similar to the previous case except for the full model where
Itint → 0, vtout → 0 as t→∞ for both κ = 1000 and κ = 100. For low values of Ng segregation arises under both fast and slow
attitude changes.
In the case of the full model (purple-dotted-dashed, κ = 100 and magenta-double-dotted-dashed κ = 1000) we see
a similar trend 〈xti〉guest → 0−, while 〈xti〉host → 0.93 for κ = 100, and 〈xti〉host → 0.99 for κ = 1000 as t → ∞.
Segregated host communities arise, with the numerically lesser guests adapting to the majority.
B. Quantifying outcomes of integration
The above results lead us to seek measures to better understand the topology of the network as a function of time,
specifically from the guest standpoint. To this end, we introduce an integration index Itint as the relative number of
out-group connections of a guest node, averaged over all nodes, and scaled by the host population fraction
Itint ≡
N
Nh
〈
mti,out
mti
〉
guest
. (4)
Here, Nh/N is the time independent host population fraction and m
t
i,out is the number of out-group connections;
the ratio mti,out/m
t
i is averaged over all guest nodes. A guest-only enclave for which m
t
i,out = 0 leads to Iint = 0.
Conversely, in a uniformly mixed guest-host configuration, mti,out/m
t
i, should not be too dissimilar from the host
population fraction Nh/N , leading to I
t
int → 1. As defined, 0 ≤ Itint ≤ N/Nh. At Imaxint = N/Nh ≥ 1 guest nodes
preferentially connect to hosts, shunning other guest nodes. We refer to this outcome as reverse segregation.
While Itint measures the connectivity between guest and host nodes, another relevant measure is the fraction of the
reward utij that arises from cross-group interactions. This is important, as guests connecting predominantly to host
nodes may not necessarily be an indicator of balanced socioeconomic growth. For example, even for large values of
Itint & 1 hosts may share large rewards among themselves but very little with guests, representing a two-track society
where guests, although connected, are not part of the mainstream socioeconomic activity.
10
In a perfect scenario, guests and hosts form an all-connected network, with NgNh out-group, host-guest connections
among the total N(N − 1)/2 edges. If the reward is distributed equally among all edges, the ratio of out-group
connections is given by 2NgNh/N(N − 1). We thus define an out-group reward fraction vtout as follows
vtout ≡
∑
i∈guests
j∈hosts
utij
∑
i∈all nodes
(j 6=i)∈all nodes
utij/2
· N(N − 1)
2NgNh
. (5)
The first term on the right-hand side is the fraction of reward shared between guests and hosts with respect to the
total. We then renormalize this quantity by the ratio 2NgNh/N(N−1) derived above for the perfectly mixed scenario.
As a result, vtout = 1 indicates a connected network with no isolated clusters and with rewards equally spread among
all nodes. Instead, vtout = 0 points to complete segregation, where no socioeconomic reward comes from cross-group
activities. Note that vtout can exceed unity if the cross-group economy is more flourishing than intra-group growth.
The dynamics of Itint and v
t
out under the same parameter choices and mechanisms used to plot Fig. 3 are shown in
Fig. 4. We first discuss the case of Ng = 200, in Figs. 4a and 4b. If we allow only for network remodeling (red-solid
curves), the system will evolve towards segregation (Itint → 0 in Fig. 4a and vtout → 0 in Fig. 4b). Here, since attitudes
cannot change, nodes will maximize their utility through in-group connections and by creating insular communities.
In the blue-dashed and green-dotted curves we deactivate network remodeling and only allow for attitude adjustment,
with κ = 100, 1000 respectively. As can be seen from Fig. 4a Itint ' 1 at all times since the random connections
assigned at t = 0 are fixed and guest and host nodes remain well mixed in time. Fig. 4b shows that as cooperative
attitudes emerge, cross-group rewards vtout increase. In the case of fast attitude adjustment κ = 100 (blue-dashed
curve), when nodes are completely cooperative, vtout → 1 as t → ∞, while in the case of slow attitude adjustment
κ = 1000 (green-dotted curve) convergence to vtout → 1 is slower.
Results for the full model reveal the subtle interplay between network remodeling and attitude adjustment. At early
times Itint follows the network remodeling case only (red-solid curve) for both κ = 100 and κ = 1000. In both scenarios
guests progressively severe their ties to hosts, due to their low utility. At the same time, attitude adjustment increases
cooperativity on the given initial connections and vtout temporarily increases. Eventually ineffective cross-group
connections are completely eliminated under slow attitude adjustment (magenta-double-dotted-dashed, κ = 1000)
where Itint → 0 and vtout → 0 as t → ∞. Under fast attitude adjustment (purple-dot dashed, κ = 100) instead
cross-group connections contribute to the utility, so that Itint → 0.6 and vtout → 0.6 as t→∞. Note that Itint and vtout
converge to the same value as t → ∞ since |xti − xtj | → 0 for both in-group and out-group connections. As a result,
the distribution of rewards directly reflects the fraction of cross-group connections.
Taken together with results shown in Fig. 3a and 3b, the above dynamics confirm the crucial role played by κ, the
attitude adjustment timescale, in determining societal outcomes. For the chosen parameters and when the full model
is considered, more rapid attitude adjustment (κ = 100) leads to a more integrated society with Itint, v
t
out reaching
non-zero values as t → ∞, and with 〈xti〉guest → 0− and 〈xti〉host → 0+. All these are hallmarks of a well-mixed,
functional society, where guests and hosts share links, their socioeconomic progress is intertwined, and groups are not
hostile to each other. On the other hand, slower attitude adjustment (κ = 1000) leads to a segregated society, where
Itint → 0, vtout → 0, and where 〈xti〉guest and 〈xti〉host converge to non zero values as t → ∞. In this case, there are
no links connecting guests and nodes, there is no shared socioeconomic interest, and groups are hostile to each other.
Society is fragmented and parallel societies have emerged. Note that these two opposite outcomes emerge from the
same set of parameters, with the exception of κ.
Because of their superior number, it is the attitudes of hosts in particular that play a fundamental role in determining
whether a society is segregated or not. This is consistent with findings from several surveys and societal observations
[11, 12]. Recall that our initial conditions were set at xi,host = 1, the most inhospitable. Figs. 4a and 4b show that
this hostile environment drives the immigrant population towards segregation, unless attitudes can easily change, i.e.
for small κ.
Results for Ng = 20 confirm the above scenario, with a small difference. Here, I
t
int → 0, vtout → 0 for both values of
κ = 100, 1000 as t→∞, while 〈xti〉guest → 0− and 〈xti〉host converge to values that deviate only slightly from unity. In
this case, the very few guests must initially interact with the many hosts and their attitude will become cooperative.
Hosts on the other hand will not necessarily link to guests, and due to their numerical superiority can remain hostile
towards them. Over time, separated enclaves of hosts and guests will emerge, with guests keeping their cooperative
attitude, but in isolation from hosts, while hosts will largely remain in the same state as at the onset of the adaptation
process. In this case, in order for a more cooperative society to emerge the value of κ must be even smaller. We have
verified this numerically, finding that for Ng = 20, κ . 40 in order for a more integrated society to emerge.
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FIG. 5. Dynamics of the integration index Itout in panel (a) and of the out-group reward fraction v
t
out in panel (b) for initially
cooperative hosts. Parameters are the same as for the full model in Fig. 3, with initially cooperative hosts and uncooperative
guests at x0i,host = 0
+ and x0i,guest = −1. (a) Itint decreases at the onset, eventually rising towards integration, where Itint → 1
as t → ∞. The initial decrease is more pronounced for slow attitude adjustment (κ = 1000) and for larger guest populations
(Ng = 200) as described in the text. (b) v
t
out increases over long times as attitude adjustment allows for more cooperation
between guests and hosts. Under slow attitude adjustment (κ = 1000) and large guest populations (Ng = 200), v
t
out decreases
at the onset, with players seeking in-group connections. As guests and hosts become more cooperative vtout increases.
C. Initially hostile host attitudes drive immigrants into enclaves
The importance of initial attitudes is further examined in Fig. 5, where at t = 0 hosts are extremely hospitable and
x0i,host = 0. Initial guest attitudes remain uncooperative at x
0
i,guest = −1. All other parameters are set as in Figs. 3
and 4. Curves in Fig. 5a and 5b arise from the full model and should be compared to their counterparts in Fig. 4a
and 4c.
In Fig. 5a we plot Itint. As can be seen, guests and hosts are no longer completely segregated. At early times,
Itint decreases due to network remodeling, however at intermediate times, guests become more cooperative so that
xti,guest → 0− and Itint → 1 for long times. The early decrease of Itint is more significant for κ = 1000, since slow attitude
adjustment leads to ineffective cross-group links and network remodeling will induce segregation. The decrease of
Itint is also relatively more significant for Ng = 200 than for Ng = 20 under the same value of κ. This is because a
larger guest population, and a larger τg = κN/Nh will more slowly evolve its initially hostile attitudes, allowing for
segregation to cut cross-group, ineffective connections. In Fig. 5b, we plot vtout which increases at early times in all
cases except for Ng = 200 and under slow adjustment κ = 1000. This is due to network remodeling. As discussed
above, the slow attitude adjustment prompts nodes to seek in-group connections at early times; the guest population is
large enough to allow for this leading to segregation with Itint ' 0.5 and an initially decreasing vtout for the red-dashed
curve. Due to the cooperative attitude of hosts however, guest eventually change their attitudes so that xti,guest → 0−,
and Itint and v
t
out increase.
One interesting finding is that when initial host attitudes are hostile, as shown in Figs. 4c and 4d, a larger guest
population more effectively drives host attitudes towards cooperation. In contrast, when initial host attitudes are
hospitable, as shown in Fig. 5a, a larger guest population results in less integration. In this case, the larger guest
population is more resistant to attitude changes, and segregation may more easily emerge.
D. Higher initial connectivity facilitates better integration
The initial social connections assigned to migrants upon arrival may affect integration outcomes. As discussed in
Section II D, one ideal scenario is that of welcoming programs that provide guests with prearranged social connections
to hosts (I0int = 1), another is that of completely isolated guests arriving in an already connected native society
(I0int = 0). In previous sections we only implemented these two extremes, perfect connectivity or total isolation. In
this section we will consider more realistic, intermediate levels of initial guest connectivity.
Figure. 6 illustrates the effects of three initial configurations: well connected guests, I0int = 0.91 (blue-solid curve),
intermediately connected guests, I0int = 0.37 (green-dashed curve), and poorly connected guests I
0
int = 0.06 (red-dotted
curve). Initial attitudes are uncooperative, x0i,host = 1 and x
0
i,guest = −1. All model parameters are the same as in
Fig. 3 with Ng = 200 and κ = 100.
The time evolution of Itint for all cases is shown in Fig. 6a. Here, I
t
int decreases at early times until guests and
hosts begin adopting more cooperative attitudes. For the initially well connected case (blue-solid curve), Itint drops
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FIG. 6. Dynamics of the integration index Itout in panel (a) and of the out-group reward fraction v
t
out in panel (b) under different
initial random connectivities. Parameters are the same as in Fig 3 with initial hostile attitudes x0i,host = 1 and x
0
i,guest = −1.
In the blue-solid curve I0int = 0.91; in the green-dashed curve I
0
int = 0.37; in the red-dotted curve I
0
int = 0.06. (a) For all three
cases, Itint decreases from the initial values, but only the initially poorly connected case of I
0
int = 0.06 leads to full segregation,
indicated by Itint → 0 as t → ∞. For the other two cases, Itint → 1. (b) For all three cases vtout increases at the onset due
to attitude adjustment, and later decreases due to network remodeling. Only I0int = 0.06 leads to long-time v
t
out → 0: as
guest-host connections are severed, no socioeconomic utility can be shared. For the other two cases, vtout increases at long
times, suggesting increasing rewards through cross-group connections.
to Iint ' 0.5 before the trend is reversed at t ∼ 1000. For the initially intermediately connected case (green-dashed
curve), the decreasing trend is not reversed until t ' 2500 when Itint ' 0.1. Finally, for the initially poorly connected
case (red-dotted curve) attitude adjustment cannot give rise to cooperation before Itint → 0 and host and guest
communities are fully segregated. Mirroring trends are seen in Fig. 6b where we plot the out-group reward fraction
vtout. When guests are poorly connected at the onset (red-dotted curve), few links exists through which attitudes can
change, guests become progressively segregated, and very little socioeconomic activity is shared. Hence, vtout → 0
throughout. For the other two cases when there is more initial connectivity at the onset vtout increases at early
times (blue-solid and red-dotted curves) as guests adopt cooperative attitudes (xti,guest → 0−) through these initial
guest-host connections. Later, network remodeling causes vtout to decline as cross-group connections are replaced with
in-group ones. At longer times, host attitudes also evolve towards cooperation (xti,host → 0+) from residual guest-host
connections. Here, network remodeling no longer favors in-group connections, and vtout increases once more.
Although these results point to the importance of an initial network of connections for immigrants, in reality very
few of them will have a support system upon arrival. Many host countries may not have adequate resources or
programs to foster such contact, and host and guest communities may view each other with suspicion. In the rest
of this paper we attempt to identify best practices leading to integration, and look at how results vary depending
on model parameters. We will consider a realistic, worst case initial condition: that of an initially equilibrated host
community and a totally isolated guest cohort, as outlined in Section II D.
E. Dependence on parameters of cross-group reward, attitude adjustment rate, and sensitivity to attitude
difference
We now study how results from the model defined in Eqs. 1–3 depend on its main parameters α, Ain, Aout, σ,
and κ. In earlier sections, we set Ain = Aout = A and determined analytically that the utility reaches a maximum
Umaxi = αA[ln(αA)−1] if each node has mopt = α ln(Aα) links. We have also verified this numerically for several α,A
parameter choices. Note that setting α . A−1/2 leads to mopt . 1 indicating a network with no links, which we have
verified numerically. We also briefly discussed how κ affects the dynamics by comparing results from high (κ = 1000)
and a low (κ = 100) regimes. Here we will conduct a more thorough investigation of the relevant parameters.
First we examine a scenario where Aout 6= Ain and the effects of varying Aout/Ain while keeping other parameters
fixed. In Fig. 7a we plot the steady-state integration index 〈I∗int〉 as a function of Aout/Ain, with Ain = 10, κ → ∞,
α = 3, and σ = 1 for Ng = 200 guests and a total population of N = 2000 nodes, corresponding to N/Nh = 1.11.
Note that setting κ→∞ is equivalent to activating network remodeling only, since the timescale for attitude change
diverges, hence attitudes xti will remain fixed at their initial values throughout the entire course of the dynamics. We
also use two different initial conditions of total guest isolation but different initial attitudes. The blue-solid triangles
represent initially cooperative populations with x0i,host = x
0
i,guest = 0, while the red-solid circles represent initially
hostile populations with x0i,host = 1, and x
0
i,guest = −1. In both cases, guests have no connections at t = 0.
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FIG. 7. Integration index at steady state. In panel (a) 〈I∗int〉 is averaged over 20 realizations and plotted as a function of
Aout/Ain with κ =∞. The bar indicates the variance. In panel (b) single representations I∗int are shown as a function of κ with
Aout/Ain = 2. Other parameters are set at α = 3 and σ = 1, with Nh = 1800 and Ng = 200. In both panels red solid circles
represent initially unconnected, hostile hosts and guests, x0i,host = 1, x
0
i,guest = −1; blue triangles correspond to fully cooperative
initial conditions x0i,host = x
0
i,guest = 0. When the ratio Aout/Ain increases, the long-time state of the network changes from
segregation to uniform mixture, and finally to reversed segregation. The transition for the default initial conditions occurs at
larger Aout/Ain ratios, compared to the cooperative initial conditions, as the former require higher compensation from out-
group connections to overlook the hostile attitudes between guests and hosts. In panel (b) each data point corresponds to one
realization. Increasing attitude adjustment time scale κ leads to increased likelihood of segregation. A bimodal regime emerges
for intermediate κ.
Each data point and relative error bar in Fig. 7a represents the mean and variance over 20 realizations, respectively.
For the cooperative case (blue-solid triangles) as long as Aout/Ain . 1 in-group connections yield higher rewards
and are preferred; hence the two populations are almost completely segregated and 〈I∗int〉 → 0.1. Conversely, when
Aout/Ain & 1 out-group connections are preferred, and 〈I∗int〉 → N/Nh = 1.11, indicating reverse segregation. When
Aout/Ain ' 1 out-group and in-group connections are equivalent in terms of their socioeconomic weight and integration
is observed at 〈I∗int〉 → 1. Note the sharp transitions between regimes. The progression segregation → integration
→ reverse segregation as a function of Aout/Ain also appears for the uncooperative conditions (red-solid circles).
However, in this case transitions are shifted towards the right, indicating that out-group connections must yield
higher socioeconomic gain to promote integration (or reverse segregation) in order to overcome the initial hostility
among players. Here, segregation persists until Aout/Ain . 6 for which 〈I∗int〉 . 0.1, full integration 〈I∗int〉 → 1 arises
for 6 . Aout/Ain . 8 and reverse segregation at 〈I∗int〉 → N/Nh = 1.11 appears only for Aout/Ain & 8. Note that in
both cases since attitudes are fixed, rewards are given by uij = Aout e
−2 if through out-group connections, and by
uij = Ain if through in-group ones. The two will be the same for Aout/Ain = e
2 = 7.39.
These results indicate that to promote integration, cross-group connections must generate higher rewards than in-
group ones. This may be realized, for example, if the immigrant population possesses skill sets that complement those
of the host population. Since no attitude adjustment is allowed in the dynamics, Fig. 7a suggests that integration
may occur even if groups maintain their hostility towards each other as long as the socioeconomic rewards are large
enough, as seen for the uncooperative case (red-solid circles). Finally, note that the same parameter sets yields very
different results for a wide range of Aout/Ain values, as can be seen by the bimodal values of 〈I∗int〉 in Fig. 7a and
underlying the role of initial conditions in determining integration or segregation.
We examine the effects of varying κ in Fig. 7b. Here, we use the same parameters as in Fig. 7a with Ain = 10,
Aout = 20, α = 3, and σ = 1. The ratio Aout/Ain = 2 provides modest incentives for guests and hosts to collaborate.
We consider initially hostile guests and hosts at x0i,host = 1 and x
0
i,guest = −1, and omit fully cooperative initial
conditions x0i,host = x
0
i,guest = 0 since, in this case, changes to κ will not alter the dynamics. Each red solid circle in
Fig. 7b is the result of a single simulation; for each value of κ simulations are repeated 20 times. The dot-plot shows
that if attitude adjustment is sufficiently fast (κ . 300) reverse segregation arises and I∗int ' N/Nh = 1.11; guests and
hosts adopt cooperative attitudes before segregation can arise. For very slow attitude adjustments (κ & 550), almost
complete segregation as I∗int → 0.1 is the only outcome. A bimodal regime instead arises for intermediate values of
300 . κ . 550 where segregation and reverse segregation are both likely. The bimodal feature of Fig. 7b is indicative
of the different timescales between the two competing mechanisms of network remodeling and attitude adjustment. If
attitude adjustment is fast compared to network remodeling (low κ) guests will quickly adopt cooperative attitudes,
and guest-only enclaves will not be formed. Conversely, if attitude adjustment is slow compared to network remodeling
(large κ) guest-only enclaves will form hindering cooperativity. In between these limits, is a regime where the timescales
of network remodeling and attitude adjustment are comparable, and the outcomes stochastic.
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FIG. 8. Time τseg to reach 〈I∗int〉 = 0.1, where 90% of guest nodes are segregated as a function of (a) the sensitivity to the reward
function σ, (b) the relative guest population Ng/N and (c) the total population N assuming Ng = 0.1N . Other parameters
are set to α = 3, Ain = Aout = 10, κ = 600 in all panels. In panel (a) Ng = 200, N = 2000; in panel (b) σ = 1 and N = 2000;
in panel (c) σ = 1. In all three cases, guests and hosts are initially unconnected and hostile to each other, x0i,host = 1 and
x0i,guest = −1. Each data point and its error bar represent the mean and the variance over 20 simulations. In panel (a) increasing
σ allows for more tolerance to attitude differences, increasing the time to segregation. In panel (b) the higher guest population
ratio leads to faster segregation as guests are more likely to establish in-group connections, forming guest only enclaves. In
panel (c) the time to segregation increases with the overall population, for a constant 10% guest population.
The last parameter we examine here is σ, which regulates the sensitivity of the reward function utij to attitude
differences |xti − xtj | in Eq. 1. Note that σ → ∞ renders utij independent of |xti − xtj |. Finite values of σ, however
large, do not determine whether in-group or out-group connections are preferred. This parameter thus will only affect
the timescale of the dynamics. In particular, since larger values of σ attenuate the sensitivity of utij to |xti − xtj | we
expect larger values of σ to also be associated with slower dynamics. We have verified this by considering the time
to reach 90% segregation, defined as Itint = 0.1, as a function of σ and for a variety of parameter choices. In Fig. 8a
we plot the time to segregation, denoted by τseg(σ), for the particular case of α = 3, Ain = Aout = 10, and κ = 600,
with initially hostile populations x0i,host = 1 and x
0
i,guest = −1 and no initial link between hosts and guests. As can be
seen, τseg(σ) increases with σ. This result suggests that decreasing the sensitivity to attitude differences, particularly
between guests and hosts, results in longer times to full segregation. This larger time window between migrant arrival
and full segregation may provide better opportunities to implement interim policies that promote cooperation.
F. High immigrant ratios and small native populations promote segregation
In this section we examine the effects of migrant population sizes compared to that of the native community. We are
particularly interested in the uncooperative, segregated case and examine how the time to segregation τseg depends
on the fraction of guests. Under parameters and conditions that favor segregation, we expect larger guest populations
will more quickly evolve to the uncooperative steady state. We thus consider a scenario where at steady state guests
segregate, resulting in xti,guest → −1, xti,host → 1, Itint → 0 as t→∞. We then keep all parameters fixed, including the
total population N , and modify only Ng to study τseg as a function of the Ng/N ratio. In Fig. 8b we show τseg(Ng/N)
for the representative case of α = 3, Ain = Aout = 10, σ = 1, and κ = 600. Initial conditions are initially hostile
populations x0i,host = 1 and x
0
i,guest = −1 and no initial link between hosts and guests. As can be seen, τseg(Ng/N) is
a decreasing function of its argument, as expected. Here, attitude adjustment timescales κ are not affected by Ng/N ,
however a larger guest population makes in-group interactions more likely under the dynamics specified in Section
II C. The increased guest-guest pairing allows for uncooperative attitudes to be maintained for longer times, lowering
the utility reward from cross-group interactions and hastening the severing of such links. Numerically lower guest
populations instead carry a higher likelihood of interacting with hosts, fostering cooperative attitudes for longer times,
and allowing for socioeconomically advantageous cross-group connections to emerge. Several sociological reports show
that conflicts between a majority Nh and a minority Ng population are less intense and frequent, if the majority
population greatly exceeds that of the minority, Nh  Ng [39]. We can conjecture that such conflicts arise when hosts
and guests are extremely polarized and segregated from each other, as for the case illustrated above. Our results
show that as Ng/N increases segregation, and by proxy, the emergence of conflict between the two groups increases
as well, confirming these sociological findings.
Finally, in Fig. 8c we plot τseg(N) as a function of the total population N by fixing Ng = 0.1N . All other
parameters and initial conditions are the same as in Fig. 8b. As can be seen, larger N populations lead to longer times
to segregation τseg(N). This result implies that the same fraction of migrants can be more easily accommodated in
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FIG. 9. Integration index at steady state. 〈I∗int〉 is averaged over 10 realizations and plotted as a function of κ and Ng/N
with α = 3 in panel (a), and as a function of κ and α with Ng/N = 0.1 in panel (b). Other parameters are set at Ain = 10,
Aout = 20, σ = 1, and N = 2000. In both panels guests and hosts are initially unconnected, with hostile attitudes, x
0
i,host = 1,
x0i,guest = −1. In panel (a), for smaller Ng/N , the transition from segregation to integration (or reverse segregation) occurs at
larger κ. In panel (b) increasing α causes the transition point to shift towards larger κ.
larger communities.
G. Transitioning from segregation to integration
In this section we study the interplay between the two timescales, κ and τseg, that determine whether or not guest-
only enclaves will form, starting from an initially hostile and unconnected mixture of guests and hosts. In Fig. 7b
we showed that fast attitude adjustment (small κ) prevents the formation of guest-only enclaves if incentives are in
place to support cross-group collaborations (Aout/Ain > 1). As shown in Fig. 8b, increasing the guest population ratio
Ng/N , shortens the time to segregation τseg and facilitates the establishment of guest-only enclaves.
To study the interplay between κ and τseg we plot 〈I∗int〉 in Fig. 9a as a function of κ and Ng/N for the representative
case of α = 3, Ain = 10, Aout = 20, σ = 1, and N = 2000. The populations are initiated with hostile attitudes
x0i,host = 1 and x
0
i,guest = −1, and no cross-group initial link. As can be seen, decreasing κ induces a transition
from segregation at 〈I∗int〉 → 0 for large κ, to integration at 〈I∗int〉 → 1, for small κ, or even reverse segregation at
〈I∗int〉 → N/Nh, for very small κ. Transitions towards integration thus are favored in societies where attitudes towards
the other are less entrenched and where guests and hosts more readily adapt to each other. Fig. 9a also shows that
transitions depend on the value of Ng/N , and indirectly on τg: larger values of Ng/N imply shorter transition κ
values. This is because increases in Ng/N , and consequently decreases in τseg, correspond to less time for attitude
adjustment to affect cross-group utility gains. Larger percentages of migrants Ng/N imply that individual attitudes κ
must be even more open to diversity if one is to observe the same target integration index 〈I∗int〉. Note that in Fig. 9a
we can also identify a bimodal regime, where 〈I∗int〉 takes on values between zero and N/Nh where final integration
outcomes depend on stochastic events.
Finally, in Fig. 9b, we study how the integration index 〈I∗int〉 depends on κ and α, the latter controlling the average
number of connections associated with each node. We fix Ng = 200 and use the same parameter values and initial
conditions as in Fig. 9a. Increasing α corresponds to increasing the number of connections per node. As can be
seen in Fig. 9b the same progression seen in Fig. 9a of transitioning from segregation to integration can be seen upon
lowering κ for fixed α. Increasing α leads these transition points to shift towards larger values of κ, signifying that
more connections per node allow for slower attitude adjustment to achieve the same integration value 〈I∗int〉. Beyond
α & 3 however, the transition regime of κ appears not to change appreciably, implying little sensitivity of 〈I∗int〉 to
the average number of connections per node.
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
As recent news reports and historical analysis attest, societal dynamics after the influx of newcomers depends
on many factors, including the socioeconomic environment of the host country, the adaptability of the immigrant
population, the open-mindedness of natives, and the degree of compatibility between guest and host values. Our model
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is based on the assumption that upon resettlement immigrants have two primary goals: socioeconomic prosperity and
social acceptance. Game-theoretic rules are used to model socioeconomic gains through a utility function to be
maximized, leading to network remodeling. Attitude adjustment is instead driven by opinion dynamics rules. The
two processes occur at different timescales: network remodeling at a timescale of unity, and attitude adjustment at a
timescale of τg = κN/Nh for guests. Due to their numerical superiority, hosts constitute a quasi-infinite bath: they
greatly impact migrant dynamics, but their own characteristics change only marginally and over very long timescales,
given by τh = κN/Ng  τg.
The interplay between the various timescales is shown across our analysis. For low values of κ attitude adjustment is
fast, cross-group socioeconomic gains are robust and immigrants are less likely to form segregated enclaves. For large
values of κ, attitudes change very slowly, and the formation of isolated guest niches becomes the most efficient way for
guests to advance their socioeconomic status. Our results are consistent with findings from public goods evolutionary
game theory models where interactions among various social contexts, such as population diversity and cultural
tolerance, lead to different ratios between the timescales for strategy evolution and network structure remodeling;
such timescale difference determines whether cooperative patterns emerge [22, 40]. In particular, cooperators will
outweigh defectors if strategy evolution is faster than network remodeling [41].
The socioeconomic reward structure associated with guest-host collaborations also plays an important role in
determining societal outcomes. As shown in Fig. 7a larger out-group versus in-group rewards, represented by the
Aout/Ain ratio, are more conducive to integration. Out-group rewards promote the willingness among a mixed
population to pursue conformity, which was identified as a key psychological factor for cooperative patterns to emerge
in game theoretical models [42]. These results suggest that segregation may be avoided if newcomers carry inherent
advantages, for example in the form of skill sets that are complementary to those of the native population, or if
governmental incentives are established to promote cross-group interactions. Fig. 7a also reveals the fundamental
role of initial conditions. If out-group rewards are much larger than in-group ones, Aout  Ain, cooperation arises
regardless of initial conditions. However, if the two are comparable, Fig. 7a shows that integrated or segregated
societies can emerge from the same parameter set, and that whether one configuration prevails over the other depends
on the initial conditions. Of course, integration is the more likely outcome if the initial attitudes are highly cooperative,
while segregation will typically emerge from initial scenarios where guests and hosts are highly hostile to each other.
This finding is also consistent with sociological observations [11, 12] where the attitude of the majority population is
identified as a primary determinant in minority segregation.
We also find that given the same social environment, a higher immigrant population ratio results in segregation,
while a larger total population will more harmoniously absorb the same percentage of immigrants, which agrees with
previous Ising-type sociophysical models of immigrant integration [43]. Our results suggest accommodating newcomers
in accordance with the host population. Small, possibly rural, communities may not be optimal conduits to integration
compared to more populous cities, especially if the percentage of migrants is large. Examples of countries distributing
refugees in proportion to the population of receiving municipalities include Denmark, from 1986 to 1998, Sweden,
from 1987 to 1991, and the United Kingdom since 2000. However, refugees were later found to relocate to larger
cities [44–46], attracted by the presence of more co-ethnics, job opportunities and housing. Recent studies have also
observed higher segregation of immigrants in rural areas, especially when the size of the migrant group is large and
hosts are hostile to guests [47–49].
Our model does not include spatial dependence or geographical factors in making and maintaining social connections.
For example, the turnover rate of social connections may be higher in denser areas, leading to inhomogeneous timescales
for attitude changes in the network. We also do not consider the effects of virtual connectivity, whereby internet
connections may render spatial dependence less relevant while also accelerating segregation as finding co-cultural
companions is facilitated in online venues.
Our model may be generalized by introducing a continuous influx of immigrants, instead of assuming a fixed
initial guest population. A continuous influx may allow us to include in-group interactions between immigrants
arriving at different times, and to study cooperation or antagonism among them. To further extend our model across
generations, since earlier immigrants and their descendants eventually may be considered part of the native community,
the xti = 0 barrier between hosts and guests must be relaxed in order to allow for generational crossover between
groups. Similarly, long-term attitude differences between hosts and guests can lead to open conflict or violence that
may curb socioeconomic rewards, including in-group ones. This mechanism would require higher order corrections
and feedback mechanisms that are currently not included in our work.
Moreover, our utility function U ti carries the same form for every node and penalizes those with too many connec-
tions. As a result, all nodes converge towards an average number of connections, which is not realistic, since actual
social networks take on small-world characteristics, with hub nodes having a large number of connections [50]. Our
model may be improved by introducing more nuanced utility functions. For example, we may postulate that nodes
with larger socioeconomic utility are able to maintain a larger number of connections, compared to those with lower
utility, creating a mechanism for hubs to emerge [51]. All these factors may influence the entire society and change
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host and guest perceptions, in a positive or negative way.
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